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Director
Advanced Research Projects Agency
1400 Wilson Boulevard
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Attention: Program Management

Dear Sir:

Enclosed is the final report for contract number N00014-76-C-0448 providing for a conference on "Limits of Military Intervention." Copies of all of the papers will be distributed under separate cover to those listed in Schedule J, pages 7 and 8 of the contract document. As a matter of information, selected papers from the conference will be published by Sage Publications as an Inter-University Seminar publication.

Sincerely yours,

Sam C. Sarkesian

Sam C. Sarkesian
Chairman, Political Science Department

SCS/pmo

Enc.

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Principal Investigator: Dr. Sam C. Sarkesian
Loyola University of Chicago
AC 312 - 274-3000, ext 357/358

Scientific Officer: Dr. John Nagay

Short Title: Limits of Military Intervention

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The threatened and actual use of force in international relations has traditionally operated under real and self imposed limitations. With the advent of nuclear weapons, it becomes even more important to analyze the limitations which condition the scope and pattern of military intervention. It is the purpose of this study to apply an interdisciplinary social science frame of reference to the limits and potentials of military intervention by the United States. The approach was to conduct research symposia which brought together social scientists and military specialists. The end product was the development of an interrelated series of analytic studies which emphasized hypotheses concerning the changing role of force and military intervention in international relations. These studies highlight the increased limitations on the use of military intervention; however, to assert the increased limitations on the use of force is hardly to deny its crucial and fundamental role in the contemporary world community.

Military intervention implies an active and calculated step, a forceful interference in another nation's external and internal affairs, to maintain or alter a condition or situation, presuming, further, that this coercion will, in some manner, benefit or protect the initiator. Such action can be described by a wide spectrum of models. Further, intervention is linked in most cases, by counter-intervention, whether it be steps taken to prevent initial intervention by an adversary or whether it be an answer in kind -- more defense, perhaps, than offensive. During a period of deterrence, there is great pressure to make counter-intervention contingencies readily available. But there exist powerful countervailing measures of politics and economics which limit or even displace military

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intervention activities. As a result, programs of counter-military intervention also require careful and continual reassessment.

Our analytical perspective is concerned with organizational analysis. The focus is on the interplay between technology, military organization, political decision making and the politico-military consequences that emerge. The scope of the propositions are world-wide since the analysis is concerned with the conceptual dimensions of the inherent issues. The time period is contemporary; that is, the present as it is extending in the years ahead. It, in effect, continues the intellectual tradition of Harold D. Lasswell's "developmental analysis." This is an outlook which is not limited to the analysis of that which has taken place, but is, rather, the analysis of that which is currently in process, on a basis, nevertheless, of past experience and reasoned assessment of alternative paths into the future. The goal is not to anticipate the future, but rather to clarify the present so that it can be better understood and thereby managed more effectively. Finally, our emphasis on the limitations of military intervention serves as an analytic device in order to highlight changes which are taking place in the role of force and violence in international relations.

The following phases were pursued in the analysis. First, the analytical dimensions of the study based on an American point of view, in terms of decision-making theory, were set forth and was followed by an exploration of the Soviet perspective. The second section focuses on developments in technology and systems of organizational control. The third and fourth sections deal, respectively, with changing military operations -- airlift, naval, ground -- and the main politico-military

efforts -- namely military demonstrations, military assistance and military sales programs, "stability operations" (more properly designated as nation building) and the functions of the intelligence community. The next two sections deal with a series of constraints and dilemmas, namely the limitations on manpower under an all-volunteer force and the contradictory pressures of military professionalism followed by domestic constraints which include public opinion as well as political and administrative organization. In conclusion, the issues of conceptual reformulation are explicated.

The core of the recent development rests on technological developments. The emergence of a new generation of conventional weapons -- the Precision Guided Missiles -- serves to expand the limitations on military intervention. These weapons increase the accuracy and the destructive power of conventional armaments, reduce the importance of numerical superiority of any adversary, and more rapidly destroy military forces committed to the field, all factors which, in varying degree, limit the use of military power.

The growth in the complexity of weapons systems and in the format of military organization has complicated the system of military alerts and outpaced the development of an effective system of command, control, and communications (C³). In the setting of world-wide deterrence, it is especially important that communications systems be at peak performing levels at all times. It is argued that unless the current American C³ system is improved, it will be very difficult to successfully relay political and military intentions to allies and/or opponents.

Despite the initiation of the "nuclear age of conflict," conventional war has continued since 1945. The current state of the "art of warfare" in air, sea, or ground operations is reflective of both technology and political powers. Supply, support, and conveyance by airlift are of crucial importance in military intervention plans. For the United States, growing limitations on fuel supplies, cutback in the base system structure, and tenuous political interactions between oil producing and oil dependent nations severely constrain the use of air support capabilities in a military intervention situation. Likewise, naval units of the superpowers are more and more exposed and vulnerable to damaging attack by the advanced military technology. Moreover, naval operations are constrained by these weapons which have a low purchase price, so that nations heretofore considered of little political consequence have increased ability to intervene. In addition, the extension of national sovereignty over larger areas of coastal waters and the potential constriction of passage through waterways and straits serve to limit the scope of naval operations of the major powers. Likewise, naval operations are affected by new surveillance systems.

Conventional ground warfare also is profoundly influenced by the new generation of weapons. Military strategy is strengthened in its defensive posture, especially in the European zone. However, under the impact of PGM's, the American forces in Western Europe must operate more and more as a force in being. The new weapons encourage arms buildups which represent both military responses and adjustments to contending political pressures.

In the realm of politically oriented military affairs, the "showing" of the American flag is now seen more as a symbol of mutual and alliance interest than as an active device for political dominance. The coercive element, once quite strongly implied by the presence of the flag, has declined for the United States. It has been supplanted by military assistance programs, which have come to be seen as institutionalized aspects of U.S. diplomacy. However, the reluctance of client states to accept this assistance in exchange for direction of their military policies by the United States, indicates that this form of military intervention is subject to increased constriction.

Since the end of the Vietnam period, the likelihood of large scale overt military intervention and even small scale military intervention in support of counterinsurgency operations by the United States remains low. However in anticipating emerging patterns, it is important to emphasize that the assessment of the successes and failures of the intervention in Vietnam has not produced a widely accepted military doctrine.

The scope of military intervention is influenced by constraints on military manpower and military professionalism. The end of the mass armed force based on conscription has produced a volunteer military force of increasing cost and decreasing size, quality, and social representativeness. In the contemporary context, military personnel faces the dilemma that limited war intervention, especially if it is protracted and difficult to pursue, could lead to a gap between military orientations and civilian public opinion which would weaken the legitimacy and effectiveness of the military.

The contemporary organization and control of the intelligence community serves as a persistent limitation on military intervention. Intelligence agencies have a tendency to augment their information collection with the sponsorship of covert politico-military operations. These functions tend to undermine the effectiveness of the conventional intelligence operations and, in a political democracy, the credibility of the assessments produced by intelligence agencies is weakened by the exposure of covert operations. Finally, it is necessary to take into account domestic constraints, namely public opinion and the structure of national decision making for national security. The available public opinion data leads to the hypothesis that the increased volatility of citizen attitudes have come to place increased restraint on U.S. military intervention. Likewise, the fragmented structure limits the effectiveness of the agencies which formulate national military policy and, in turn, the management of military intervention. The decision making process is one which gives the military extensive access and influence, but on an individual service basis. The result is that the increased military potentials are not articulated with foreign policy objectives.

The relevance of this analysis for contemporary scholarship is that it contributes to a realistic and responsible assessment of the consequences of military intervention. By formulating and exploring a series of systemic hypothesis, the application of social science analysis to a study of military intervention is enhanced. As a result, it is possible both to avoid concern with overly abstract concepts and the formulation of "predictions" which are based on the extrapolation of

immediate trends.

Crisis situations will arise where a military response is deemed to be proper, but this analysis underlines that the decision makers will have to operate within a narrow scope and delimited time frame. Moreover, the observations about increased limits of military intervention rests in part upon the expanded scope and effectiveness of counterintervention. The search for deterrence and beyond that for "stabilization" remains paramount along the entire continuum of military and politico-military operations. Those who advocate the use of military force for intervention will have to be more precise about the goals to be achieved and the price to be paid. U.S. military and security postures remain world-wide in scope; this is dictated by the interdependence of the world community and the nature of contemporary weapons. But recognition of the limits of military intervention can only make for more realistic and more effective policies and practices.

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Prologue to THE LIMITS OF MILITARY INTERVENTION: CONTEMPORARY DIMENSIONS

Edited by Ellen P. Stern

This study is an outgrowth of the need to identify the resolves and achievements, the misconceptions and mistakes of the recent past, to assess the direction of international relations, and to identify the changed potentials and consequences of military intervention from the point of view of the United States.

Intervention implies an active, calculated step, a forcible interference in another nation's external and internal affairs, to maintain or alter a condition or situation, presuming, further, that this coercion will, in some manner, benefit or protect the initiator. Such actions can be described by a wide spectrum of models. Military engagements can range from guerilla tactics to conventional battle between the most sophisticatedly-equipped professionals; from weaponry of the most minor easily obtainable variety to the H-bomb.¹

Further, intervention assumes, in most cases, a counter-intervention, whether it be steps taken to prevent initial intervention by an adversary or whether it be an answer in kind—more defensive, perhaps, than offensive. During a period of deterrence, there is great pressure to make counter-intervention capabilities readily available. But there exist powerful countervailing measures of politics and economics which limit or even displace military intervention activities. As a result, programs of counter-military intervention also require careful and continual reassessment.

This analysis focuses on the limitations of military intervention mainly as an analytical device. By a concern with limitations, it is possible to highlight changes which are taking place in the role of force and violence in international relations. Conventional and popular and polemic thinking about military forces is fragmentary; therefore, our goal

is to be more holistic and more systemic, and this requires an examination both of the consequences and of the limitations of military intervention.

The time reference is the immediate present and as it is unfolding in the years ahead. To accomplish this task, it is necessary to reach back, at times, and the historical time-frame depends on the question at hand. Access to history requires reasoned judgment about the relevant previous experiences. On the other hand, the goal of this analysis is primarily not to anticipate the future, but rather to clarify the present so that it can be better understood and thereby managed more effectively. Therefore, in organizing this endeavor, I and my collaborators took note of Harold D. Lasswell's notion of "developmental analysis." This is an outlook which is not limited to the analysis of that which has taken place, but is, rather, the analysis of that which is currently in process, on a basis, nevertheless, of past experience and reasoned assessment of alternative paths into the future.²

Policy makers and academics, each for different reasons, see the need to consistently reevaluate the obvious, but basic, postulate that American capabilities for intervention have been limited in scope and pattern with the advent of nuclear weapons. The finale of the Vietnam epoch has provided an appropriate and much needed moment in which to undertake such an evaluation. The tortured and unclear search for detente, volunteer force systems, precision-guided weapons, altered world-wide economic relations, and shifting social structures are all factors which condition the resulting assessments.

The constituent elements of this study uniformly assume that a plateau in the nuclear arms race between East and West has been reached.

A "limited adversary" relationship and the sense of nuclear "equality" have led American and Soviet leaders to search for alternative modes to express their cooperation and competition. It is an inescapable platitude to note that the East-West polarity has been augmented by a North-South imbalance. The growing participation of the non-industrialized countries in the international arena cuts across cold-war alliances. The cleavages are no longer designated as communist or non-communist.

The North-South schism does not center on ideologies, but on resources; the new materials and energy reserves needed by the East and the West are to be found in the non-industrialized states. The growing tension between these nations and their former colonial masters has been expressed first economically and, in turn, in political-military dimensions. The United States and the Soviet Union continue to seek alliances and to support their client states among the developing nations; but the analyst of international relations is alert to emerging arenas of mutual interest between the two super-powers.

The transformations of the 1960's among youth have brought new patterns of social mobility and life style. In the West, one of the visible consequences has been the increased indifference to the basic symbolism of the nation-state where, as Anthony Mockler puts it, "patriotism is the only justification for taking up arms."³ Conscription has been abandoned by the United States, Great Britain, and Canada, and constricted in various Western European nations. The generations born after World War II do not retain the perception of the "communist" or nuclear threat borne by their parents. The willingness of youth to serve in the combat arms is as limited as is its desire to see its government intervene in the conflicts of "others." The age gap includes not only life styles but also incorporates attitudes about national security and national defense.

The new social and political orders greatly influence the concepts of deterrence or, alternatively, stabilization. National consciousness and solidarity are strained. Writers as diverse as Joseph Schumpeter and Karl Mannheim, as well as those more specifically concerned with the military profession, such as Morris Janowitz, have suggested that these complex cleavages result from the very success of democratic systems of government.⁴ In a society where freedom of choice and expression is so heavily emphasized, it is inevitable that societal needs and considerations are often eclipsed by personal, almost hedonistic, satisfactions.

One repeatedly noted feature of the 18th and 19th century war machines was the centralization of the means of technology -- of violence -- by an increasingly professionalized force structure.⁵ These trends have persisted in the 20th century in most of the industrialized nations. However, in the 19th century, the economics of war were also controlled by these force structures. But during the 20th century, we have witnessed a reversal. Economics no longer directly respond to the requirements of military organizations. In the political democracies, resources available for military expenditures during a period of prolonged tension and deterrence are subject to powerful constraints. The demands for welfare expenditures become power competitors. Further, the unbalance of military institutions reflects the importance of and access to energy and raw material resources. The economics of these factors constrain (or may even control) the capability to wage war and to perpetrate existing political arrangements, that is, the dominance of the currently recognized superpowers.

Force and military intervention will not disappear: is this a banal simplification? I would argue not. However, its use is undergoing singular

changes and this volume seek to clarify its changing dimensions.

The contemporary compendia of article and books dedicated to assisting nation-states in the search to abolish violence may prove more that violent expressions are endemic to men. As such, this study converges with those undertaken by pacifist philosophers and peace research groups. While the farsighted goal may be a world without wars, our common sense directs us to focus on the mode of expression of violence, and how the inclination toward war making will be directed, moderated, or restrained. We cannot ignore the oft-repeated observation that, from the point of view of Western nations, the role of violence in international relations has undergone "fundamental changes." Strategic planners need to accept the fact that the restrictions on the use of military power will expand in the future.⁶

The research design of this investigation of the limits of military interventions is based on a number of interconnected steps. These elements are designed to cover, in a holistic fashion, the various aspects of intervention. First, there is a discussion of the analytical dimensions of the study based on an American point of view, a perspective developed in terms of phases in decision-making theory, which is followed by an exploration of the Soviet perspective. Since "developmental analysis" is rooted in an assessment of past experience, the second section offers an analysis of selected historical problems which center on limits of military intervention: the development of the intelligence community and an exploration of the impact and consequences of strategic air warfare. The crux of the contemporary settings is dealt with in the third section which focuses on technology and systems of control.

The social science apparatus which has been offered is subsequently applied to concrete military settings. In the fourth and fifth sections,

respectively, changing military operations--airlift, naval, and ground--are examined, followed by the main politico-military efforts--namely military demonstrations, military assistance and military sales programs, and "stability operations," more properly designated as nation-building. The next two sections deal with a series of constraints and dilemmas; namely the limitations on manpower under an all-volunteer force and the contradictory pressures of military professionalism, followed by domestic constraints, which include public opinion as well as political and administrative organization. In conclusion, the issues of conceptual reformulations are explicated.

As indicated, our endeavor is focused on organization or "institutionalization." We are concerned with military technology, but not at the expense of a consideration of societal trends and the accompanying organizational contexts. Our objective, which encompasses questions of theory and history, manpower and technology, politics and society, centered on the interplay of these factors in determining the role of force in future U. S. action.

Our approach must of necessity emphasize short-term trends, but we sought, further, to depart from oversimplifications which stress straight-line projections or which only appease some segment of the political body. We also recognized that the political context can be changed by events and by determined leaders. We considered how the issues of consequences and limits of military intervention are conceptualized both by social scientists and by policy makers who must develop operational strategies and the extent to which these perspectives converge or diverge.

In the first section, Richard Smoke's analytic discussion of military intervention deals with all the elements in our frame of reference. Food, energy, and mineral reserves are potentially just as valuable bargaining

commodities as technology and weapons. The sophistication and diversity of military technology have engendered a self-perpetuating pressure for the accumulation of ever-more advanced weapons, a pressure which is rapidly spreading to developing nations.

Smoke is a political scientist who is concerned with how military decisions are made. By identifying imperfections in how the system presently works, it can be modified by those actually involved. Smoke cautions against a tendency toward a "reductionistic cascade" in decision-making. By this he means that the technical factors concerning weapons and strategies tend to overshadow the significance of various conceptual elements in the decision process. Smoke's major criticism of American military intervention capabilities lies in this deemphasis or general lack of policy analysis and planning in depth. However, the trend toward pre-programmed plans and options may be a step in the wrong direction, since this programming prevents easy transition to alternative crisis strategies. Another drawback to the de-emphasis on conceptual factors is a tendency toward the premature "crystallization" of perceptions on the part of policy makers, which may deny or dismiss a meaningful hearing for possible solutions other than military intervention. In this context, it is predictable that escalation may result despite policy-makers original intentions to try to avoid it. An inability to be flexible due to overly rigid planning obviously can be as dangerous as a failure to plan at all.

Roger Hamburg's "Soviet Perspectives on Military Intervention" analyzes Soviet perceptions of U.S. foreign policy postures and the resulting mutual power calculus. He proceeds by means of drawing on an innovative approach, namely, an examination of the assumptions and content of the research generated by the Soviet specialists on the United States. Soviet strategy is always dictated by political objectives; this is a basic tenet of Marxism-Leninism, and the Soviets see no need to alter that key

perception. The Soviets approach the intervention model differently than do the Americans: outside of war, force is to be used potentially and symbolically, as a constraint against possible adversaries and to confound their diplomatic-strategic calculations. This is preferred to actual deployment (excluding naval demonstrations) where it loses its "bargaining chip" characteristics, except under the most highly favorable circumstances. Economic and political strategies, especially in the guise of a client state, are their most effective policy options. Nevertheless, the Soviets believe that there are great obstacles in their path. According to Hamburg, the Soviets obviously feel more secure in the American "business-like" approach to "detente" than in the distortions of the cold war period. He asserts that they are well aware of their weaker economic base, both domestically and in the "third world," which does not permit them the variety of initiatives employed by the United States in the post World War II world. However, it is necessary to keep in mind that the Soviets are prepared to allocate a much higher proportion of their limited resources to military programs.

Hamburg concludes that the initiative to prevent war and to increase stability remains a U. S. responsibility and he is particularly concerned with the improvement of communicative networks. "Improvement of communicative networks" is critical in the sense that the Soviets must understand us in the way we intend to be understood, except where ambiguity is a deliberate strategy. An American military posture must act as a constraint on Soviet behavior without creating an exponential arms race or a series of escalating crises.

In the second section, the two analyses which draw on historical experience challenge conventional wisdom. In the case of intelligence, Paul

Blackstock concludes that there are inherent limitations in a political democracy's ability to control covert operations, and that this is an inescapable limitation on military intervention. In the case of strategic air warfare, George Quester concludes that contrary to the widespread view that strategic air warfare has in the past had limited utility, there are specific conditions where it has been crucial or at least profoundly important.

Blackstock presents a history of past approaches to intelligence gathering as they affect military intervention, and an analysis of the changes which the Congressional investigations of the mid-1970's seek to force on the intelligence bureaucracy. For one school of thought concerning the function of intelligence dictates the complete separation of intelligence procedures from the policy-making system. If, in this model, the policy maker must only be presented with new and objective facts of a crisis, there must be the ability to step back from already committed policy and to accept critical documentation indicating alternative policies.

The opposing view contends that a marriage between intelligence and policy is feasible. It would be hoped that individuals gathering intelligence would not permit their biases to permeate their reports. However, as has been pointed out by several observers, the results can be that the intelligence apparatus shoulders the blame for what works out to be wrong policy.

The core of Blackstock's analysis deals with the trend by which intelligence agencies seek to expand their function from information collection into covert operations. Covert operations include black propaganda, bribery, deception, secret support for political groups, and, finally, covert military operations. Blackstock is engaged in the analysis of

organizational behavior, for he sees this outcome as a widespread movement which both weakens the conventional intelligence function and produces "adventurism," which is self-defeating, highly unproductive, and difficult to control. In this dimension, the limits of military intervention are profound, persist, and continue to enlarge.

In the post Vietnam era, threat perception has changed and as a result the demand for extensive covert operations has substantially narrowed. But the pressure to launch a clandestine effort is always present. Proliferating Congressional intelligence control committees and continuous press exposure tend to limit intelligence operations. However, by emphasizing sound data collection, the essential intelligence function can be maintained.

In a parallel fashion, the past effectiveness of strategic air warfare is assessed by George Quester, a scholar well-acquainted with intellectual studies of war, sophisticated weapons, and their ties to morality and political effectiveness. His contribution, "The Impact of Strategic Air Warfare," traces the American use of strategic air warfare in World War II and during Vietnam, and the difference between these operations. The author is intrigued by the apparent line between seeming callousness and brutality of Americans in the harnessing of technology to "inflict suffering" on the people of Dresden, or Hiroshima, or North Vietnam and the ever-present ability to justify these programs in the name of morality or military effectiveness. Further, it is interesting to note that while the sense of "cause" identified during World War II declined in varying degrees, during the American engagements in Korea and Vietnam, the drive for airpower utility increased.

Quester highlights the great concern with upgrading precision so as to spare lives and equipment of U.S. forces, and to impress the enemy with the abilities of the U.S. military organization. But, he argues that, at times, the U. S. has extensively pursued a policy of strategic restraint, and more

importantly, it has demonstrated that strategic airpower can help achieve both military and political objectives. In the end, he raises the question whether if Americans lose their faith in the power of air warfare, their zeal for overseas military intervention will also fade.

In the third section, the focus narrows to contemporary issues of technology and the control of military operations. To "New Weapons Technology and the Impact on Intervention," James Digby brings both a scientific and a managerial expertise to a highlight of new abilities to limit military intervention. He focuses on the progress and perfection of the American weapons arsenal and especially on precision weapons. The great concerns about the use of the most destructive weapons erodes the ability to resort "to all means" to gain victory. The result is a restraint which profoundly influences the course of political and military action and makes more urgent an understanding of the precise use of military power.⁷

If one assumes that the nuclear devices are so awesome in war that they are likely to remain relegated to their lockers or to underground or underocean testing for the immediate future, what weapons will the United States count in its arsenal for military intervention? In the decade of the 1970's there has been a concern about /^{the} new generation of more technically advanced non-nuclear weapons, and concurrently in non-nuclear war.

The superpowers have two paths to follow in weapons acquisition and supply. The author indicated that one path stresses the modern (PCM's) and similar devices; the other leans on traditional weapons which would seem to have more varied uses. The PGM's are considered less expensive in the long run, they can be less vulnerable, and their precision makes them more suited to carrying out tasks precisely.

However, the widespread availability of the new generations of weapons can limit the capacity of a country to intervene militarily. While making the

military power of the United States and the Soviet Union more usable, these weapons will reduce the "superpower monopoly on deterrence." Since the political and economic shifts of the last decades have increased the spread of equals, military technology can be readily bought on the open market; it is no longer the sole property of the industrialized and scientifically advanced. Some of the previously categorized lesser powers now have the ability to intervene, with either economic force or with the new conventional weapons, though the calculus of these new balances is quite difficult to estimate. Moreover, the attrition of those new weapons in battle is enormous, Digby argues, and their immediate destructive impact in the battlefield even greater, both which may increase dependence on the supplier state. The results of the new technology seem to favor the defense, rather than the offense at least for the near future. One clearly gets the impression that whether or not this is the case, the outcome of battle with these new weapons is more difficult to anticipate, and therefore they have added in another dimension limiting military intervention.

There are several different steps along the military intervention continuum which are directly influenced by military technology and communications systems. Military alerts represent the initial steps of a posture of intervention. Joseph Kruzel critiques the existing signal system which, in his analysis, produces poor crisis-management and weakens the quality of decision making. It is both difficult to successfully communicate a threat of intervention action, and it is equally difficult to distinguish, as the recipient, the negotiating implications of this threat of force. As situational stress mounts, this "gray area" between political overtures and war mobilization constricts, and decision makers view the action or response alternatives as diminishing, with the "enemy" appearing in an ever-improving

position to manage the crisis.

Kruzel dissects the basic argument as an almost irreconcilable polemic between the civilian and military leaders responsible for the management of a possible intervention crisis. The military professionals are considered demonstrate to/a lack of sympathy for diplomatic considerations, viewing them as constrain on necessary military preparations. In order to insure combat readiness, they tend to emphasize the necessity of military preparations. This is an elemental aspect of their responsibilities. However, in fact, frequently they recommend and suggest flexible or non-military responses. But in the management of a military alert, it would in error to overlook the difference between military commanders and civilian political leaders. Th is difference limits the effects of military alerts. Moreover, the potential for diplomatic misunderstanding persists, as a real issue, when considering the basic differences between Soviet and American readiness levels. Not only is the eventual execution of a signal of paramount importance, but the understanding of "the enemy's" different perception of preparedness or posture level is key. As the costs of intervention rise, the importance of pre-intervention diplomacy rises correspondingly.

Davis B. Bobrow is a political scientist with expertise in the role of information in national security decisions analysis of organizational behavior. The problematic issues of command, control, and communications (C³) deal with the interface of technology and human behavior. Bobrow focuses on interactions which develops in large-scale defense organizations--both civilian and military. Once a diplomatic proposal has been tendered, the C³ system must be at its peak performing capability to recieve, relay, and interpret response signals to the

initial alert. Bobrow emphasizes that an effective C³ system must be at its peak performing capability to receive, relay, and interpret response signals to the initial alert. Bobrow emphasizes that an effective C³ system should not be called upon to substitute for well-developed and meaningful policy and objectives. Nevertheless, it should be well advanced if prepared policies are determined to be weak or inaccurate. His analysis emphasizes realistically the importance of the system's place in the military intervention scenario.

The C³ system of the 1970's has failed, ⁱⁿ specific ways, to meet its challenges. For example, the 1975 Mayaguez crisis exposed serious flaws in the system: an inability to ascertain critical logistical information once the signals were received and , further, an inability to securely control the execution of the intervention through the chain of command. To what extent does such weakness inherently contribute to an ambiguous national security posture? As the author indicates, striking a vigorous political-military posture, either for domestic consumption or for international allies, may be a dangerous course unless an effective C³ system exists to manage American initiatives or counter-initiatives and interpret the reactions of others.⁸

The trend toward reliance on advanced technology systems is certain; what then are the realities of actual use? The future roles of land, sea, or air forces, depend on an understanding of the technological advantages and limitations in military intervention. Despite the initiation of the "nuclear age of conflict," conventional conflict has continued to proliferate in the post World War II period. Let us not forget that some theorists argued that future conflict would involve nuclear materials, by virtue of their existence. However, the weapons of the 1950s and 1960s were almost uniformly of World War II variety, with limited improvements; further, manpower procurement and training systems, supposedly a key factor

in effective utilization of nuclear systems, were only marginally altered. The fourth section presents analyses of the impact of changed technological and organizational format on military operations.

Obviously, supply, support, and conveyance of military equipment and nonmilitary goods are of crucial importance in the preparation for or in the conduct of military intervention. When one speaks of military intervention in the contemporary period, the role of air power encompasses airlift capabilities to assist allied states, as well as to support U.S. military operations.

John Pickett's discussion of airlift stresses the strained operational conditions affecting U.S. conduct of a conventional war. First, in the post Vietnam period, there has been a reduction in manpower levels. Second, there has also been an extensive reduction in the base structure system which could seriously hamper the flexibility of an air force response.

The limitations on air lift capabilities are technical and organizational, as well as political. For example, the fuel supply question is crucial.⁹ From a logistics point of view, fewer bases mean fewer refueling locales. With fewer places to refuel, alternatives are also reduced. The worst alternative is outright abandonment of support activity. In other cases, political allies may be approached for aid, or negotiations for refueling or base rights may be initiated with heretofore unaligned nations. This process would be time-consuming and may entirely checkmate interventionist actions. Further, as attested from NATO experiences, support for American military actions may be denied for fear of economic sanctions by oil producers. The political ramifications of these logistical problems must be seriously weighed in reviewing American capabilities for intervention.

In "Changing Naval Operations and Military Intervention, " Michael MccGwire indicates that the new weapons systems increase the capability of

rendering naval forces ineffective or obsolete. Again, the author's combination of a naval and academic career provides a perspective concerning the viability of naval activities. Consequently, the rights of maritime passage have succumbed to international tensions and there now exists little unclaimed or uncontested marine space. Operationally, surveillance systems and technical weaponry can render a naval force immobile and helpless. Moreover, the acquisition by purchase or "lend-lease" of advanced weapons systems by formerly minor powers further jeopardizes naval intervention, access to contested arenas, and, ultimately, self-preservation. While a vessel may be equipped with the most sophisticated and effective weaponry, the political and economic considerations may weigh heavily against unfettered naval intervention plans. Naval operations, especially those launched for specific intervention, must be conducted within narrow confines.

The case of conventional land warfare, with particular reference to the European theatre, is presented by Lewis Sorley, a former Army officer, in his analysis, "Changing Military Operations: Technology, Mobility, and Conventional Warfare." The assumption of the development of U.S.-Soviet nuclear parity underlies Sorley's analysis of changing military operations by ground forces, and Europe is the crucial theatre of operations. The crux of the role of the ground forces is the maintenance of a credible and effective conventional force, in order to reduce the threat of the outbreak of nuclear war. Military operations therefore involve the new personnel and organizational issues, when introduction of precision-guided missiles is considered. Given the destructive capacity of these weapons, the ground forces must become more and more of a force in being--in fact a force in place. While the full impact of the new generation of conventional weapons has important problematic elements, Sorley's analysis converges with that

of Digby. In this crucial dimension, the logic points to increased capacity of a defensive thrust response--that is, to an increase in the potential of counter-intervention, and thereby to an increase in the limits of military intervention.

Military operations have not, in the past been limited to the actual application of firepower--there has been an intermediate area in which military systems--that is weapons and military organization--have been intertwined with political negotiations and political presentations. The term politico-military operations is only a modern term for long standing practices--practices which have become more complex and more uncertain in their implication. Moreover, both the U.S. and the Soviets have found economic lines of intervention extremely effective, especially in situations where the employment of military force is ill-advised or not feasible. In section five, three different types of politico-military activities are assessed; military demonstrations, military sales and assistance programs and finally counterinsurgency--in which direct military action is actually undertaken. The spectrum is broad and reflects the scope of United States actions in the world arena. By contrast, the Soviets have probably learned much from the American experiences in Vietnam, and may attempt to avoid the dilemmas of the political model devised for Vietnam by the United States.

Maury Feld approaches the analysis of military demonstrations from a sociological and political point of view; he is a sociologist with a strong interest in history and his paper seeks to compare 19th century interventions with those of the 20th century. He deals not only with the direct military impact, but with the symbolic and institutional results. "Military Demonstrations: The Flag and Intervention," reviews the concept and act of "showing the flag" as a centuries-old practice to reenforce

political hegemony. Flag-showing, as intervention, was established when, as a "groundbreaker," an actor ventured into an area where the conventions of international behavior had yet to be established. The flag demonstrations of past centuries could be identified as the precursors of foreign aid. However, in the 20th century, a more comprehensive and binding alliance system attached new meaning to the use of the flag; in Feld's words, it is displayed as "a token of mutual interest, rather than as an act of asymmetrical aggression." The Soviets retain a "state of siege" mentality from their 1917 experience and the aftermath of allied intervention. Whereas the "liberal" outlook inclines Western powers to accept most every nation-state as a de facto ally, the Soviets regard every non-Marxist society as a de jure opponent. Surrounded by enemies and adversaries, allies may be found in an assortment of geographical places and with an array of ideologies. The West, and most particularly the United States, has attained a cultural perspective which limits options in the establishment of a network of friends and allies; intervention originally was a gesture of parochial contempt--treating others as aberrations. Therefore, perhaps it may appear that the Soviets are more flexible, overall, in their approach to outright intervention, military assistance, or simply providing kindred support by the demonstration of the flag.

Caesar Sereseres combines the perspectives of an analyst for a professional research organization and the more introspective viewpoint of an academic in his analysis of military assistance programs. His study explores this more indirect form of military intervention, a form designed as a substitute for direct intervention. The support of a neutral or allied country by means of military assistance continues as a vital component of American foreign policy operations. Further, the author argues that for the domestic American public, the programs of

of military sales reenforce the notion of strength and dominance in the world arena. However, when carefully scrutinized, these program-- both military assistance and military sales--emerge as only marginally important to basic national security for the United States. There are, however, key elements in diplomatic interactions abroad, and for public relations between the American government and the American people.

Sereseres also maintains that the security assistance programs produce negative results which outweigh the outstanding benefits. Recipients are less eager to accept American arms and economic supplies in exchange for "blanket permission" from the United States to direct planning and operations, as was often the case in the past. The author's implication is that future decades will witness a decline in the use and effectiveness of this instrument of influence and diplomacy.

Stability operations, counterinsurgency, or effective nation building, have been at the core of U.S. politico-military intervention and counter-intervention plans. Lawrence Grinter draws on a wide background of familiarity with Southeast Asian political institutions and with the history of the American involvement in Vietnam. He quotes George Kennan that it is important to recognize that not all places and regions are of equal importance to the major powers." During the 1950's, American leaders determined that Vietnam was a highly important region for U.S. security and that that locale would be essential place to halt the "creep of communism" in Southeast Asia. Domestic political considerations and psychological warfare tenets meant that it was as important to propagandize effectively the giver, as well as the receivers of aid. Indeed, throughout much of the 20 year U.S. involvement in Vietnam, the American people believed that Vietnam was a backward society greatly in need of American political, economic, and finally, military support. The U.S. planted its

"flag" on Vietnamese soil as a declaration that a stand was being made--an intervention which was designed to succeed.

Grinter asserts the widely held principle that the success or failure of past or future American "stability operations" depends on the character and capabilities of the regimes the United States elects to assist. While the principle was not totally ignored in Vietnam, it was eclipsed, which explains some of the determinants of the American failure. American pluralistic traditions were also a liability in our search for a Southeast Asian strategy. The assistance programs launched in Vietnam reveal the weakness of a variety of programs without a coherent single purpose. The multiplicity of American bureaucratic organizations contributed to a fragmented assistance and intervention effort.

Grinter describes the competing models which guided U.S. practices, some of which did not stand much of a chance of successful implementation because the U. S. did not appreciate the political climate and culture in which advice, money and troops were being introduced. The Stability Operations/Economic Development Approach model described by Grinter was conceptualized during the 1960-1963 Kennedy administration. The goal was to bring a third world country through the modernization process, utilizing American economic, social, and technical resources. Also labeled "The Rostow Doctrine," this plan was the major tenet of an approach to problem solving by the U.S. in non-industrialized areas more generally. The major issue was seen as the communist proclivity to interfere by "subversion" of these transitional societies. The model was supplemented, and finally supplanted by the Military Occupation Model relabeled "search and destroy." This approach had its roots in the French-Indochina experience. The French colonial experiments of the late 19th and early 20th centuries were only successful when there was a weak opposition or one without external support. The Americans, too, found little

more success than the French in this pacification approach.

The Administrative Approach--a tried and true colonial operation of the British--fared a bit better than most other models employed by the U.S.. Law and order and bureaucratic efficiency are emphasized and ideology is downplayed.. The fact that the communists were utilizing almost the same perspective was, however, a contributing factor to its low return value for the Americans. Nevertheless, the U.S. generally felt this model to be one of the more useful for Vietnam.

In general, the conventional response to problem solving has been to transplant Western values to a non-Western conflict setting. While this may appear to some to be a simplistic dilution of the cause of the American failure, I would suggest that this basic orientation must bear the burden, rather than more caustic indictments of individual strategic decisions. This is not to overlook that there was a strong moralistic, even messianic impulse in the U.S. military intervention in Southeast Asia, which gave it the character of a "lost crusade."

Many years of professional experience in U.S. military service plus social science expertise describe the backgrounds and perspectives from which Thomas Fabyanic and Sam Sarkesian explore the military manpower and professional variables limiting military intervention. In the era of volunteer force systems--with their lowered manpower levels--combat readiness and performance capabilities for a series of contingencies ranging from low-response, peace-keeping activities, to conventional frontal battle engagements are of pointed importance in calculating emerging U.S. abilities for military intervention.

Thomas Fabyanic's combination of historical perspective and quantitative analysis shape his presentation of recent trends in manpower

levels of the U.S. military forces. Fabyanic focuses on the declining ability of the all-volunteer system to assure adequate forces-in-being of quality manpower and to provide a military force structure of adequate qualitative and quantitative dimensions to provide credibility for a strategy of deterrence.

A key question then , is whether the United States can still represent itself as a "superior" nation militarily. In terms of its arsenal of weapons, there can be little doubt of U.S. strength and superiority. But what of that element of force occasionally referred to as "brute force" that is men. There are two important issues that follow: to what extent has the all-volunteer formula reduced our numbers of men in uniform so severely as to affect combat performance, and to what extent has the new format altered the meaning of service in the combat arms.

Perhaps the major effort of manpower limitations with the all-volunteer force is the degree to which it will affect U.S. intervention capability. The era in which the U.S. could intervene militarily and escalate to extremes may have ended, and Fabyanic suggests that in the future, the U.S. may need to use deescalation as a tool of reciprocity.

The issue of quality is not only a question of skill, but of motivation and commitment once called patriotism. As Fabyanic points out, even the most highly skilled army may become overnight an anachronism in our "technetronic era." The creation of the all-volunteer force is only in part a response to technology; it is also a redefinition of civic responsibility and an expression of public disdain for the draft.

The external pressures on the all-volunteer force are matched by internal organizational pressures. The officer corps of the United States

has come to think of itself as a professional group, with the concepts of "duty, honor and country" as the hallmark elements. The question has been raised, especially by Charles Moskos, whether the introduction of the all-volunteer concept and the increased penetration of civilian values are shifting the officer corps from a profession, with a sense of calling, to more and more of an occupational model.¹⁰ One of the attractions of the all-volunteer forces has been the higher salaries available than under the conscription formula. This leads the military to legitimize service in terms of the marketplace and thereby alter the basis of the military service.

Sam C. Sarkesian addresses the professional dilemmas that the officer corps faces in limited war, that is limited war of the Vietnam model which is of the protracted and unconventional nature. He argues that under such circumstances, ambiguity of purpose create ethical gaps between society and the military which erode military legitimacy. Moreover, professional uneasiness has developed about the capability of volunteer forces which is compounded by the distinction between elite and conventional units with imputed negative impact of combat effectiveness. How can the professional carry out professional goals in an environment characterized by ambiguity and inherent conflict between societal and military goals? The implication of this analysis is to highlight the powerful factors which "militate" against a policy committing troops into an ambiguous, multi-dimensional environment associated with modern war. In this view, it is necessary for the military profession to assert itself on the basis of enlightened self interest and accept these limitations and not merely rely on the traditional dogma of "duty, honor, country."

The issues of professionalism extend beyond those which have been explored here. However, professionals have traditionally been thought of as strengthening the capacity of the military to intervene; in the contemporary period, professionalism is a variable in the potential limits on intervention.

The tragic experiences of Vietnam may have indeed engendered the potentiality of a neo-isolationist national perspective. John Mueller, a political scientist trained in quantitative methods and at the same time deeply critical of the available public opinion data, has charted the change of attitudes toward American military intervention and the conduct of American policy in the international arena. His study, "Changes in American Public Attitudes toward International Involvement," assesses American attitudes on defense expenditures, the campaign against communism, and the fear of war.

The first question which must be answered concerns the parameters of public opinion toward the military establishment itself. Mueller's study needs to be interpreted in the light of the findings of David Segal and John Blair.¹¹ The U.S. military institution, per se was held in significantly high esteem by the majority of the American public during the Vietnam period, and even immediately thereafter. It was the war itself, and the leaders of political and business institutions, not the military, which suffered a sharp decline in public confidence and esteem. It is civilians and non-military institutions which are perceived to have the greatest influence involving the military might of the United States in foreign conflict and military intervention.

The massive and continuing surveys of public opinion on which Mueller draws indicate a long-term decline since the end of World War II in the level of support for overseas military intervention and for defense spending.

It does appear that by 1975 this decline had ended. Of course, the responses in public opinion surveys are weak indicators of the political support that a president may well be able to mobilize in emerging conditions. However the importance of Mueller's study rests in his analysis of the opinion concerning Korea and Vietnam--limited military engagements. While during World War II, public support increased with duration of hostilities, comparable public support in the two subsequent limited military interventions declined with the passage of time. There is every reason to believe that the same decline could operate, and even more rapidly, in potential cases of military intervention in the years ahead.

Current trends in public opinion influence U. S. political institutions which have repeatedly been described as sharply hampering the responsiveness of the military institution to pursue effective politico-military policies. Paul Schratz, a professional naval officer with extensive academic and civilian government experience, reviews the fragmentation of American political institutions as a factor controlling military intervention. His chapter, "National Decision Making and Military Intervention," offers an explanation for the seeming decline of military power during a period of intensified concern with military technology. His argument focused on political and administrative organizations which have proliferated tasks, to their mutual detriment.

Nevertheless, Schratz concludes that under prevailing circumstances the military establishment suffers no lack of access and influence. In fact, the military, input, which is too periodically/oriented to individual services, is too extensive. His interpretation of the effect of the War Powers Resolution on congressional-executive relations in future military interventions

is prophetically intriguing. The weakness of the Congress in foreign policy--disclosed in a survey commissioned by Congress itself--are quite disturbing. It is impressive that Congress and the President authorized such an extensive analysis of the governmental role in policy formulation. The findings confirm the long held view that a new relationship between the legislative and executive branches is essential if the military is to be made fully effective and responsive to national aspirations as well.

As an epilogue, the paper, "Beyond Deterrence: Alternative Conceptual Dimensions," by Morris Janowitz, serves, in various ways, to integrate the themes presented in this study. His approach is that of the military and political sociologist concerned with the linkages between domestic socio-political order of industrialized societies, especially the United States and the changing international order. Internally, the United States is experiencing a dispersion of political power which is paralleled by a diffusion of power in the international community. Because these international changes take place at varying rates in different regions of the world, new elements of instability become operative.

As Janowitz says at the beginning of his remarks, "the classical categories for analyzing military organizations and strategy must be reconceptualized . . ." And this is his goal and those of the authors of this analysis. Policy makers and leaders concerned with the daily stream of events--crisis-oriented or otherwise, often do not present adequate concern with the "larger picture." Such a posture, obviously, is one of the hazards of responsible decision-making. "Beyond Deterrence," strives to present a larger framework which makes use of the concept of stabilization. His effort to make the vocabulary of stabilization more precise is a major innovation; it rests on an interdisciplinary perspective. The analysis of

international relations, and the changing role of the United States can no longer be limited to military or economic resources. The full gamut of socio-political and socio-psychological stimuli influence the conduct of U. S. foreign policy. In turn these factors condition the reception--or perception--of these policies by adversaries and third parties. "Destabilization" thus results not only from military and economic factors, but from political definitions and lack of clarity about the intention of key actors. Thus, Janowitz is searching for conceptions and formulations which both analyze the reality of international politics and help political leaders control the flow of events by making their intentions clear. It is important to emphasize that stabilization is offered as such a concept, because it does not mean the maintenance of the status quo, but the basis of orderly and justified change.

There is always the possibility of unexpected developments--political and even technological . Moreover, the scope and intent of the adversaries' programs are subject to wide differences of assessment, as has been the case in the Soviet military buildup of the 1970's. But my assumption and that of my collaborators is that the main outlines of the international military balance emerge gradually and with reasonable clarity. The result is that the contending powers can adjust their responses in a deliberate and measured pace. Hence, it does appear sound to assume that the effective nuclear parity between the United States and the Soviet Union will be maintained, rather than greatly altered; the U.S. political leadership could not and would not tolerate a distinct imbalance. In other words, in a more basic sense, there is a worldwide system of strategic military forces with a reasonable degree of stability, which provides the framework within which issues of the limitations and consequences of military intervention can be analysed. Given the analytic perspective of those involved in this study, there was little chance of utopian thinking.

One of the aims of this volume has been to avoid strategic cliches; likewise, mechanical extrapolations of trends also have been discouraged. The limits on emerging military intervention are real. The clearest and notably obvious conclusions of this study is that they are increasing. But the reality of the constraints does not negate the likelihood of particularized military intervention. Crisis situations will arise where a military answer is deemed proper; but the decisionmakers will have to operate within a narrow scope and delimited time frame. Moreover, the analysis of the limits of military intervention serves to clarify the strategy of counter-intervention as an essential mechanisms of deterrence and of stability. But in this regard, the limits on the U.S., and the Soviet Union need to be seen in their stark reality. Hopefully, the successes and failures of the Cold War period and the agonizing lessons of the Vietnam period will caution those who advocate the use of military force to be more precise about the goals to be achieved and the price to be paid.

NOTES

1. For an interesting diagramatic explanation, see Nordal Åkerman, On the Doctrine of Limited War, trans. Keith Bradfield (Lund: Berlingska Boktryckeriet, 1972), p. 17.
2. For a more detailed presentation, consult Harold D. Lasswell, "World Politics and Personal Insecurity," in A Study of Power (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1950), pp. 3-9.
3. Anthony Mockler, The Mercenaries (New York: Macmillan, 1969), p. 16.
4. Morris Janowitz, "Military Institutions and Citizenship in Western Societies," Armed Forces and Society 2 (Winter 1976): 200. See also, Morris Janowitz, Social Control of the Welfare State (New York: Elsevier Press, 1976).
5. Michael Howard, "Change in the Use of Force, 1919-1969," in Brian Porter, ed., International Politics, 1919-1969 (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 140.
6. For a converging summary, consult Klaus Knorr, The Power of Nations: The Political Economy of International Relations (New York: Basic Books, 1975).

7. For a more detailed presentation of this issue, see the classic pieces by Raymond Aron, A Century of Total War (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1954) and On War (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1959).
8. See Richard Burt, "New Weapons Technologies: Debate and Directions," Adelphi Paper No. 126 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1976), p. 30.
9. Consult Geoffrey Kemp, "The New Strategic Map," paper presented for the conference, "The Consequences and Limits of Military Intervention," University of Chicago, June 1976.
10. Charles C. Moskos, Jr., discusses the issue of the emerging military model at length in a paper, "The Emergent Military: Calling, Profession, or Occupation?" presented at Symposium on Representation and Responsibility in Military Organization, University of Maryland, January 1977.
11. David R. Segal and John D. Blair, "Public Confidence in the U. S. Military, Armed Forces and Society 3 (Fall 1976): 3-11.